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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1967

No. 841

MONSANTO COMPANY, ROTARY DRILLING SERVICES, INC., AND PETE BARTLETT,

Petitioners,

v.

CHEROKEE LABORATORIES, INC.,

Respondent.

PETITION OF MONSANTO COMPANY FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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FIDELITY PRINTING COMPANY, INC., HOUSTON

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PETITION OF MONSANTO COMPANY FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Monsanto Company prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in the above-entitled case on July 25, 1967.

CITATIONS TO OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, printed in Appendix A, p. 11, had not been reported when this petition was printed.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was entered on July 25, 1967. (R. 2067, Appendix A, *infra* at p. 28). Rehearing was denied on September 13, 1967. (R. 2088.) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C., Section 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a statutory monopoly granted by a lawfully obtained patent can become violative of Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act when the patentee has done nothing more than: (1) select a single distributor to whom alone it would sell the patented product, without restriction as to price, sales territory or customers; and (2) refused to sell to or create one or more competing distributors.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutory provisions involved are Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1955),[1] and Section 154 of the Patents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154.[2] They are printed in Appendix B, pp. 29, 30.

STATEMENT

This is a private treble damage antitrust suit presenting a new and unique question involving the unilateral program of a single manufacturer. It goes well beyond the factual situation confronting this Court in *United States* v. *Arnold, Schwinn & Co., et al.*, 87 Sup. Ct. 1856 (1967). The controversy here centers around a product known as Lytron 886 (hereinafter Lytron) and its manner of distribution to the ultimate consumer. Lytron was developed by Monsanto Company (hereinafter Monsanto) which secured, on September 15, 1953, a patent covering its composition and manufacture. (R. 113; 436). This patent granted to Monsanto for a period of seventeen years from that date "the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States". 35 U.S.C. § 154. Although initially conceived as a soil conditioner for agri-

[1] Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209.

[2] Act of July 19, 1952, 66 Stat. 804.

cultural application, it was later discovered to have more value as a drilling mud additive in the drilling of certain oil and gas wells in which low solids drilling fluids could be used — potentially at least 5,000 wells out of 55,000 to 60,000 drilled in this country in a single year. (R. 1327; 1259). Monsanto sold small amounts of Lytron directly to oil and drilling mud companies during the period 1953-59. (R. 114). In 1956, it had, for the first time, sold some Lytron to Rotary Drilling Services, Inc. (hereinafter Rotary) (R. 1334). Rotary, in turn, sold the product at that time through manufacturers' representatives to the oil industry. (R. 121).

On March 25, 1960, Pan American Petroleum Corporation applied for a "use patent" covering the use of Lytron and any similar product as a drilling mud additive.[3] (R. 121). A "use patent" is a patent directed to the use of one patented product — such as Lytron — in conjunction with certain other agents in a particular use area — here as a drilling mud additive. Although Lytron had been in use as a drilling mud additive prior to Pan American's patent application, it was the unique combination of abilities to flocculate (settle out) drill solids and beneficiate (extend or expand) the drilling mud that Pan American's use patent was intended to exploit. Effective January 1, 1960, Pan American, as the "use patent" holder, granted Rotary a nonexclusive license to sell such products having this combination of uses. (R. 121, 122).

In about June, 1960, Rotary made its first sale of Lytron to Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. (hereinafter Cherokee). (R. 1364). At that time — and until January, 1963 — Rotary did not have a sales organization of its own and Cherokee made direct sales of the product through its sales force to mud companies in the oil and gas well drilling industry. (R. 122).

---

[3] The "use patent" was issued on December 25, 1962 (R. 121)

On February 13, 1961, Monsanto and Rotary entered into a letter agreement whereby Monsanto agreed to supply Rotary with its full requirements of Lytron and to refer to Rotary all potential oil field drilling industry customers. For its part, Rotary agreed to promote the product, at its expense, and both parties agreed to consider renewal of the agreement in two years. (R. 115-117).

From 1960 until January, 1963, (which includes a period of almost two years after it signed the initial agreement with Monsanto) Rotary continued to sell Lytron exclusively to Cherokee for resale to the mud companies who were the principal customers for the product. Cherokee was the only concern selling the product to such customers during this period and Lytron became one of its most important products.

In January, 1963, Rotary hired the ex-president of Cherokee and four ex-Cherokee salesmen and began selling Lytron directly to the mud companies. (R. 1410; 1411). Rotary contends it did nothing to cause this turnover but Cherokee claims the employees were "pirated" away by Rotary. Monsanto did not have anything to do with the switching of personnel between Rotary and Cherokee. (R. 880; 881). For purposes of this petition, however, the Court is asked to assume, *arguendo,* that Monsanto knew of this change of employees when, in January, 1963, it renewed its letter agreement with Rotary. (R. 123). The February, 1961 letter agreement between Monsanto and Rotary and its 1963 renewal, are the only formal agreements between the parties. At no time did Cherokee have any written agreement or contract with either Rotary or Monsanto nor, until April 8, 1964 (after this suit was brought), did it acquire from Pan American, a license to sell additives such as Lytron. (R. 822, 823).

When, in 1963, Rotary began the direct sale of Lytron to the mud companies, it raised its price to Cherokee — in effect charging Cherokee a "retail" rather than a "wholesale" price. (R. 1798). The price Rotary charged the ultimate consumers after it took back the exclusive sale of Lytron from Cherokee was never more, and in some cases less, than Cherokee had charged when it was the sole outlet. (R. 1799, 1801). At no time did Monsanto increase its price to Rotary. When Cherokee saw it could not profitably continue to get Lytron from Rotary, it turned for the first time to Monsanto. (R. 1490). Monsanto refused to sell directly to Cherokee and thus make it a distributor of Lytron. Cherokee contends Monsanto's refusal to sell was based on its letter agreement with Rotary which Cherokee calls an "exclusive dealership" agreement. Later, Cherokee tried to market a competing product which its field tests showed was just as good as Lytron and which it represented to be an improvement over Lytron. (R. 1720) This effort failed. Cherokee has sued Monsanto and Rotary for treble damages claiming violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 3, Clayton Act[4] as well as the Texas Antitrust Law. Federal jurisdiction in the District Court was based upon 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22. The trial court directed a verdict for all defendants at the conclusion of Cherokee's evidence on both the federal and state claims. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for trial on the federal antitrust action but affirmed as to the alleged state violation. No appeal has been taken by Cherokee from that part of the Court's judgment. Among the issues considered by the Court of Appeals was Monsanto's claim of exemption from antitrust prosecution because of its Lytron patent. The Court summarily dis-

[4] Cherokee voluntarily dismissed its Section 3, Clayton Act claim at the conclusion of its evidence. (R. 2034)

missed Monsanto's patent rights holding that the first sale of Lytron from Monsanto to Rotary "exhausted" Monsanto's patent monopoly. Monsanto seeks now to have that judgment reviewed — and the trial court's judgment ultimately affirmed — on the ground that Monsanto here has done nothing more than exercise rights lawfully granted to it under its patent on the product in controversy — and therefore should not be subjected to prosecution for treble damages under the Sherman Act.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. This case is in direct and irreconcilable conflict in principle with the many decisions of this Court which proscribe a private antitrust remedy where legitimate patent rights are lawfully exercised. There is no question — and Monsanto does not dispute — "that where a patentee makes the patented article and sells it, he can exercise no future control over what the purchaser may wish to do with the article after his purchase." *United States* v. *General Electric Company et al,* 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926). But in the instant case, Monsanto did not exercise any degree of dominion or control over the Lytron once it had been sold to Rotary. Nor did Monsanto seek to impose any restraint whatsoever upon Rotary — or Cherokee while Cherokee was the sole outlet — as to price, sales territory or customers with respect to the product. In short, Monsanto has not overstepped legitimate rights granted it by law to "exclude others from making, using or selling the invention." 35 U.S.C. § 154; *Bement* v. *National Harrow Company,* 186 U.S. 70 (1902).

More recently, in *Sears, Roebuck & Co.* v. *Stiffel Company,* 376 U.S. 225 (1964) the Court had occasion to articulate the rule: (p. 229)

> "The grant of a patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly. . . . Patents are not given as favors . . . , but are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention. *During that period of time, no one may make, use, or sell the patented product without the patentee's authority. . . .*" (Emphasis added)

Monsanto certainly recognizes that a patent grant has limitations and does not insulate the patentee from antitrust prosecution where there is a misuse of the patent or where it has been fraudulently obtained. See, e.g., *Morton Salt Co.* v. *G. S. Suppiger Co.*, 314 U.S. 488 (1942); *Walker Process Equipment, Inc.* v. *Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.*, 382 U.S. 172 (1965). But the Sherman Act does not abolish a patentee's right of control over making, selling or using the patented article. Here, Monsanto chose to make Rotary — and not Cherokee — a distributor to sell its "highly specialized" patented product in a "very limited market."[5] How Rotary chose to get the product to the consumer was of no concern to Monsanto just as Monsanto was not concerned with the price Rotary charged, the territory in which it sold the product or the customers to whom the product was sold by Rotary. Certainly, Monsanto had no objection to Rotary selling through Cherokee — or any other outlet. What Monsanto was concerned with, and by law entitled to, were the legitimate fruits of its patent, which it could best obtain in the "very limited" market concerned by establishing a single wholesale distributor and not a series of competing distributors.

Monsanto looks to this Court for guidance. If the method it chose of distributing Lytron has put it in jeopardy of

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[5] The product and the market were thus described by the Court below. See Court's opinion, p. 12, *infra*.

violating federal law, then Monsanto is anxious to change it system now and in the future, if for no other reason than to avoid the not inconsiderable burden of defending treble-damage antitrust suits brought by disgruntled would-be distributors of its products. It can only change its system, however, in one of two ways: first, by making everyone a distributor who asks to be — which is Cherokee's contention in this case. Obviously if the product is "highly specialized" and the market "very limited" as in the instant case, a proliferation of distributors — or even the addition of one competing distributor — can so dilute each distributor's profit that any incentive for promoting the product is lost. Second, Monsanto can market the product directly to the consumer — by-passing all independent distributors. This alternative would only insure the extinction of the independent distributor system and accelerate the trend toward complete vertical integration of the entire distribution process. See, *United States* v. *Arnold, Schwinn & Co.*, 87 Sup. Ct. 1856 (1967).

2. The Court below determined that a possible fact issue existed in this case as to whether or not Monsanto and Rotary monopolized or attempted to monopolize the market in violation of Section 2, Sherman Act. This holding is in direct conflict with the rule announced in *Walker Process Equipment, Inc.* v. *Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.*, 382 U.S. 172 (1965). There, this Court held "that a treble damage action for monopolization which, but for the existence of a patent, would be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act may be maintained under § 4 of the Clayton Act [treble damage statute] if two conditions are satisfied: (1) the relevant patent is shown to have been procured by knowing and willful fraud practiced by the defendant on the Patent Office or, if the defendant was not the original patent applicant, he had been enforcing the patent with knowledge of

the fraudulent manner in which it was obtained; and (2) all the necessary elements otherwise necessary to establish a § 2 monopolization charge are proved." 382 U.S. 172 at 179. Neither condition was satisfied in the instant case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons this petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

.....
Thomas M. Phillips

.....
James R. Coffee

.....
R. Gordon Gooch
Counsel for Petitioner,
Monsanto Company

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the Petition of Monsanto Company for a Writ of Certiorari in the above styled case has been served on Mr. Jack N. Price, 422 N. Green Street, Longview, Texas, by depositing same in a United States mail box, with first class postage prepaid on November ...., 1967.

.....
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APPENDIX A

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22736

CHEROKEE LABORATORIES, INC.,

Appellant,

versus

ROTARY DRILLING SERVICES, INC., ET AL.,

Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.

(July 25, 1967.)

Before RIVES, WISDOM and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.

RIVES, Circuit Judge: The plaintiff[1] seeks damages arising out of alleged violations by defendants[2] of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 and 2, and the Texas antitrust laws, Arts. 7426-7447, Texas Re-

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[1] Cherokee Laboratories, Inc., hereafter referred to as "Cherokee".

[2] Monsanto Company, Rotary Drilling Services, Inc., Kenneth D. Fisher and F. M. Bartlett, hereafter referred to as "Monsanto", "Rotary", "Fisher", and "Bartlett", respectively.

vised Civil Statutes. The district court quashed the service of summons on the defendant Bartlett. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the district court directed a verdict for the remaining defendants. From the ensuing judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

The complaint relates to a highly specialized commodity in a very limited market. Cherokee's principal business is that of marketing additives to mud systems in drilling oil and gas wells. The product Lytron 886, hereafter Lytron, is a chemical polymeric compound originally developed by Monsanto research chemists for its effects on the fertility and cultivation of the soil. On September 15, 1953, U. S. Patent No. 2,652,380, was granted to Monsanto covering the composition and manufacture of Lytron. Its attempts to market the product for soil treatment met with failure, but it soon discovered that Lytron had potential as a drilling mud additive.

Rotary is an Oklahoma corporation, whose sole stockholder, prior to January 1963 was Bartlett. In 1956, Rotary began selling Lytron as a flocculating agent, that is an agent which "flocs" or congeals drilled solids and bit cuttings and settles them out of the mud system. About 1957 Pan American Petroleum Corporation, with research laboratories in Tulsa, Oklahoma, began experimental work with Lytron through which it later discovered that Lytron, in addition to acting as a flocculating agent, would "beneficiate," that is extend the yield of bentonite, a clay used as a mud builder in drilling mud systems. On March 25, 1960, Pan American applied for a patent covering this unique combination of uses of this and similar products, and on December 25, 1962 was granted Patent Number 3,070,543. This suit relates to the market of products having the combined ability to flocculate and beneficiate drilling muds in the oil field drilling industry in the United

States. We accept Cherokee's description of the relevant market:

> "The Pan American patent actually defines the scope of the product market (i.e., products have combined beneficiating and selective flocculating abilities when used in a drilling mud system).
>
> "Geographically, the market for the product is the United States. The size of the market is not measured by area, but by the number of wells in which low solids drilling fluids can be used (R. 1259). The market for Ben-Ex (Cherokee's tradename) is a fairly small percentage of the total wells drilled in the United States each year, but there are approximately 55,000 to 60,000 wells drilled in a year, and an appreciable number of these are wells in which this material could be used (R. 1327). According to Dr. Paul Hawley, of Pan American Petroleum Corporation, there are at least 5,000 wells per year drilled in which Ben-Ex could be used, and Pan American Petroleum Corporation drills about 500 of these (R. 1259). At the end of 1963, only approximately 1,000 of these wells, or 20 percent of the potential market, was being serviced (R. 1327).
>
> "The market for Lytron 886 increased from 100 wells drilled in 1961, to a thousand wells per year by the end of 1963 (R. 1327). The principal customers for the product are Magnet Cove Barium Corporation, Houston, Texas; Baroid Division, National Lead Company, Houston, Texas; International Minerals and Chemicals Corporation, Houston, Texas; Milwhite Mud Sales Company, Houston, Texas, and numerous small mud companies (R. 1190)."

At about the same time as it filed its application for the patent, Pan American granted a nonexclusive license to Rotary to market the product. From early 1960 until January of 1963, Rotary did not have a sales organization; it made no sales of Lytron directly to drillers or mud service companies, but sold only to Cherokee for resale to the oil

and gas industry. Cherokee, being the only concern selling the product during this period, developed the market and it became one of the most important products sold by Cherokee.

In February 1961, Monsanto and Rotary entered into the following written agreement:

"Rotary Drilling Services, Inc.
Post Office Box 7265
Tulsa, Oklahoma

Attention: Mr. F. M. Bartlett

Gentlemen:

Summarizing our previous correspondence and the discussions which you have had with Mr. Wilkinson, Monsanto proposes to reply (sic) on you to promote the use of our polyelectrolyte resin Lytron 886 as an additive to oil well drilling muds on the following basis:

1. Monsanto will sell you your full requirements of Lytron 886 for a period of two years beginning March 1, 1961. The price and terms of sale of this product will be those currently in effect and as they may be changed from time to time. Current prices and terms of sale are set forth in the attached price schedule. Please note that, as set forth in the Conditions of Sale appearing on the reverse of the present price schedule, Monsanto cannot be liable for any claims arising from use of our products in a buyer's manufacturing processes or in combination with other substances.

2. Monsanto will refer to you all inquiries which it may receive during this two-year period relative to use of Lytron 886 in oil well drilling mud applications. You are aware, however, that we have other customers for this material and that legally we would have no right to attempt to restrict the end use made by others as to products sold them.

3. You agree to make all reasonable efforts to promote the use of Lytron 886 in oil well drilling muds through sales activities, advertising and other marketing efforts to be conducted by you and at your own expense. Monsanto will, however, stand ready to provide you such technical assistance as in our judgment would be helpful to support this promotional effort.

4. Prior to the expiration of the two-year period of this agreement, the parties will review the progress which has been made and the prospects, as they then appear, for future growth in your proposed use of Lytron 886 and will discuss an appropriate basis for a continued relationship.

"If the foregoing is agreeable with you and you wish to go forward in accordance with it, please so indicate by signing and returning to us the attached copy of this letter.

Very truly yours,

s/c C. L. Jones

C. L. Jones
Director of Sales
Resin and Coating Products

mpd
Enclosures (2)

Date: .....

Agreed to:
ROTARY DRILLING SERVICES, INC.

By s/ Floyd M. Bartlett
F. M. BARTLETT

Its President"

From 1955 until January 1963, Fisher was with Cherokee, first as sales engineer, then sales manager, then vice president and finally as president. In January 1963, Fisher and four of Cherokee's salesmen left Cherokee and joined Rotary which began selling directly to the mud companies.

Rotary was purchasing Lytron from Monsanto at 0.80 or 0.85 per pound, depending on whether it was purchased in carload or partial lots. Up to January 1963, Rotary was selling Lytron to Cherokee at $1.25 per pound and Cherokee was reselling it to mud companies at $2.00 per pound and to drilling companies at $2.85 per pound. Monsanto did not raise its price to Rotary. However, after Rotary took over sole distribution of Lytron, it raised the price to Cherokee from $1.25 to $1.80 per pound. Rotary also absorbed freight to the nearest warehousing point to the customer, and reduced its price to customers on sales from 10,000 to 20,000 pounds from $2.00 to $1.90 per pound, and at 20,000 pounds or over to $1.80 per pound.

On February 1, 1963, the sales agreement between Monsanto and Rotary heretofore quoted, *supra* pp. 5, 6 and 7, was renewed by letter agreement as follows:

"Rotary Drilling Services, Inc.
Post Office Box 7265
Tulsa, Oklahoma

Attention: Mr. F. M. Bartlett

Gentlemen:

Monsanto Chemical Company is agreeable to the renewal of our agreement dated February 13, 1961, for a period of two years beginning March 1, 1963. A copy of the terms of this agreement is attached.

If the foregoing is agreeable with you, and you wish to go forward in accordance with it, please so indicate by signing and returning to us the attached copy of this letter.

Very truly yours,

s/ T. B. Wilkinson

T. B. Wilkinson
Product Sales Manager
Industrial Resins

TBW:lhs

Date: Feb. 1, 1963

Rotary Drilling Services, Inc.

By s/ F. M. Bartlett
F. M. Bartlett

Its President"

Cherokee attempted to purchase Lytron from Monsanto but was informed "that they had some sort of arrangement with Rotary Drilling Services whereby all of the oil field sales had to go through Rotary." The last purchase of Lytron by Cherokee was from Rotary of 2000 pounds at the increased price of $1.80 per pound on April 29, 1963. Cherokee then ceased to sell Lytron, leaving Rotary as the only seller of that product to the oil and gas industry in the United States.

There was only one other product known to anyone other than Pan American which might possibly perform the same functions as Lytron, i.e., beneficiate or extend the yield of bentonite clay and flocculate or drop out drill solids. This product was manufactured by the General Aniline and Film Corporation. For the required function, it was mixed with soda ash. When so mixed the product was called "Gantrez." The research and development department of Cherokee discovered this use of Gantrez in late 1961 or early 1962. A use patent was denied because such use was already covered by the Pan American patent. In the spring of 1962, Cherokee attempted to get the product licensed by Pan American, but without success. Pan American's tests proved to its satisfaction that Gantrez was not a satisfactory product for this use. Lytron is the only product ever approved by Pan American under its patent. As to Pan American's laboratory tests of Gantrez, Dr. Paul Hawley testified:

> "Several such tests have been made. One was made when the material was originally submitted to us early in 1962, probably in the month of February. The other tests were made in late 1963 and early in 1964. In all of the tests, approximately the same results were obtained on the properties which we looked for in a material which is supposed to be a good bentonite beneficiater and a drilling solids flocculent. The material tested was not outstanding. It was better than some other materials we had tested and not as good as several others, including Lytron 886."

Commencing in October or November 1963, Cherokee attempted to market Gantrez which it represented as its new and improved Ben-Ex. Effective April 8, 1964, Cherokee secured a license agreement from Pan American subject to several provisos, including the following:

> "Licensee agrees that in its sales and promotion efforts it will not represent that Pan American endorses in any way the use of a mixture of Gantrez resin and soda ash, or its equivalent, as a drilling mud additive."

Cherokee made ten or twelve sales of Gantrez amounting to approximately 4000 pounds. The market then suddenly "dried up" after Pan American sent a letter to its field offices stating that Cherokee's product was inferior to Lytron.

I.

The district court erred in quashing the summons served upon the defendant Bartlett. That service was under Article 2031b, Texas Civil Statutes, which provides for service on a nonresident who "engages in business" in Texas by serving the Secretary of State, as agent, in any suit "arising out of such business done in the State." Section 4 of the Article provides:

> "Any * * * nonresident natural person shall be deemed doing business in this State by entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State, or the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this State."

The complaint contained a number of allegations which would charge Bartlett with doing business in Texas. Among others, it charged that he committed a tort which included a conspiracy with Fisher then a resident of Texas, to be performed in part in Texas, the purpose and eventual result of which was to induce Cherokee's sales force to leave Cherokee and join Rotary. Service of process on Bartlett was valid.

II.

We review the district court's direction of a verdict for the defendants in the light of the Supreme Court's statement that "the right to trial by jury applies to treble damage suits under the antitrust laws, and is, in fact, an essential part of the congressional plan for making competition rather than monopoly the rule of trade, see *Fleitmann* v. *Welsbach Street Lighting Co.*, 240 U.S. 27, 29." *Beacon Theatres* v. *Westover*, 1959, 359 U.S. 500, 504.

So far as the testimony has developed, there is no real dispute about the substantive facts. The case turns on the inferences to be drawn from those facts. In a recent opinion by Chief Judge Tuttle,[3] this Circuit has held that *Lavender* v. *Kurn*, 1946, 327 U.S. 645, has general application in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a question for the jury:

> "If proven facts do give support to the inference necessary to sustain a plaintiff's case, then, under the

[3] Planters Manufacturing Company v. Protection Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Cir., No. 23019, decided May 26, 1967, ms.

rule of *Lavender,* it is immaterial that they give equal support to a contrary inference. It is only when there is a *complete absence* of probative facts to support the conclusion reached that the jury's judgment may be ignored."

The district court stated its reasons for directing a verdict as follows:

"* * * I have been unable to find any case by any Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court that has in anywise held contrary to or overruled the holding of the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in *Kinnear-Weed versus Humble Oil and Refining Company* [214 F.2d 891, 894] to the effect that public injury is a necessary condition precedent to a cause of action such as that asserted by the Plaintiff in this case under the Federal antitrust laws.

"Now, in each case that the Plaintiff has cited to the Court there has been a holding that that particular alleged violation, or violations there, was a violation per se. The evidence in this case wholly fails to establish, in my opinion, a per se violation of the antitrust laws.

"And, while I think there are some merits maybe to some of the other grounds asserted by the moving Defendants in their Motion for Instructed Verdict, insofar as the Federal antitrust laws are concerned, I need not go any further than this determination that the Plaintiff has wholly failed to establish in this case any public injury.

"Furthermore, I find and conclude that the Plaintiff has wholly failed to establish a case under the Texas antitrust laws.

"Therefore, the Motion for Instructed Verdict of each of the Defendants will be granted."

III.

In *Rogers* v. *Douglas Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc.*, 5 Cir. 1959, 266 F.2d 636, 644, we again gave consideration to the question of showing public injury in private Sherman Act cases and said:

> "In the Sherman Act Congress has determined that certain prohibited activities are injurious to the public. * * * * As to classes of restraints which from their 'nature or character' are unduly restrictive, Congress has determined its own criteria of public harm. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 79 S.Ct. 705, 709. In restraints, like the present one to which 'the rule of reason' applies, while the jury should not, and cannot properly, reject the policy of the Sherman Act which has been determined by Congress, it must still decide whether the particular conduct is reasonably calculated to prejudice the public interest which that Act is designed to protect. * * * * That does not mean that specific public injury must be proved before a private person can recover; but before it can be said that the conduct is forbidden as *unreasonably* restraining trade or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act it must appear that it *tends* or is *reasonably calculated* to prejudice the public interest."

We adhere to those views. They are sustained in a full discussion in a recent text, Timberlake, Federal Treble Damage Antitrust Actions, ch. 15, §§ 15.01-15.07, pp. 191-206.

> "When the factual situation does not present a per se violation, before a violation may be found, it must be determined that the activity unreasonably restrains trade. If it is not unreasonable it is not a violation. The only way in which to determine whether an activity is unreasonable is to apply the test of injury to the public as part of the broader test of the rule of reason."[4]

[4] Timberlake's full discussion demonstrates, we think, that this view is consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with allegations and proof of "public injury" in private actions under the antitrust laws.

If the evidence presented no more than the substitution of Rotary for Cherokee as the exclusive distributor of Lytron, there would be no public injury because there would be no more restraint of trade than existed at the time of the substitution. That is, however, too narrow a view. Cherokee complains that it was prevented from marketing Lytron in competition with Rotary. It was open to the jury so to find, and further to find that such a restraint is reasonably calculated to prejudice the public interest. Rotary bought Lytron from Monsanto at 80 cents per pound and resold it to the mud companies at $2.00 per pound. A jury could reasonably infer that if Rotary had competition the markup in price would be somewhat less than 150 percent. Further, Rotary was servicing only about 1000 wells per year out of a potential of at least 5000 wells per year. With two distributors competing, some of the remaining 80 per cent of the potential market might have been serviced with resultant savings in drilling costs.

It was clearly open to the jury to infer from the original letter agreement, dated February 13, 1961, between Rotary and Monsanto and the correspondence leading up to that agreement that Rotary was to be the exclusive distributor of Lytron to the oil industry and that Rotary agreed to limit its sales to that industry. We agree that Cherokee proved no injury from that limitation, for Cherokee was interested only in sales to the oil industry. We agree also that, even though Rotary was to be the exclusive distributor, the initial distributorship agreement between Monsanto and Rotary may have been entirely reasonable and legal. Monsanto's attempts to market Lytron had been unsuccessful. At that time no one other than Rotary and its sole stockholder, Bartlett, expressed an interest in undertaking to develop and distribute Lytron in the oil and

gas market. The market was in its infancy. Monsanto sought to establish a market for Lytron by placing it in the hands of a single distributor who would actively promote and stimulate sales for the product. We need not review the many authorities cited by the parties on the validity of exclusive dealership agreements, for the law has been fairly summarized by the Supreme Court in the very recent case of *United States* v. *Arnold, Schwinn & Co., et al.*, No. 25, Oct. Term 1966, decided June 12, 1967:

> "At the other extreme, a manufacturer of a product, *other and equivalent brands of which are readily available in the market,* may select his customers, and for this purpose he may 'franchise' certain dealers to whom, alone, he will sell his goods. Cf. *United States* v. *Colgate & Co.*, 250 U.S. 300 (1919). If the restraint stops at that point — if nothing more is involved than vertical 'confinement' of the manufacturer's own sales of the merchandise to selected dealers, *and if competitive products are readily available to others,* the restriction, on these facts alone, would not violate the Sherman Act." (Emphasis added.) (Slip opinion p. 10.)

In the present case it was open to the jury to infer that competitive products were *not* "readily available" to others. Even so, we need not decide whether a jury could properly determine that the initial distributorship agreement constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade. The critical time in this case is when their sales agreement was renewed in February 1963.

The situation had radically changed in the two years since the original agreement. While the market was not completely developed, it was no longer in its infancy. Roughly 1000 of the potential 5000 annual drillings of wells were being serviced as compared with service to only 100 wells drilled in 1961. Monsanto's sales of Lytron

to Rotary had been multiplied many times:

"Year ****	Pounds	Price
1960	11,000	9,350.00
1961	36,500	31,025.00
1962	112,340	93,337.00
1963	172,750	138,200.00"

Of more immediate concern, the jury could have found that Rotary had excluded Cherokee from the market and that Monsanto had some knowledge or notice of the dealings between Rotary and Cherokee.

Indeed, in the state of the record when the verdict was directed at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, we think that the jury could have inferred the existence of facts constituting a per se violation of Section 1 on the part of Rotary and Monsanto. The jury could have found that Monsanto refused to deal with Cherokee because of its agreement with Rotary, and that Rotary priced Cherokee out of the market which it was able to do only because of the protection of its agreement with Monsanto. Such conduct would constitute a per se violation of Section 1.[5] See *White Motor Co.* v. *United States,* 1963, 372 U.S. 253; *Klor's, Inc.* v. *Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,* 1959, 359 U.S. 207; *Northern Pacific Railway Co.* v. *United States,* 1958, 356 U.S. 1; *Lorain Journal* v. *United States,* 1951, 342 U.S. 143, 154, 155; *Washington State Bowling Prop. Assn.* v. *Pacific Lanes, Inc.,* 9 Cir. 1966, 356 F.2d 371.

We have thought it necessary to discuss at any length only the agreements between the two corporations, Cherokee and Rotary, for the evidence clearly developed a case for the jury's determination as to whether Fisher agreed

[5] Unless Gantrez was truly a competitive product with Lytron, which, as hereinafter discussed, also presents a question of fact for the jury.

with Rotary and its sole stockholder Bartlett that Fisher and four salesmen would leave Cherokee and join Rotary to promote Rotary's sale of Lytron and to exclude Cherokee from the market.

We hold that lack of proof of public injury, the reason relied on by the district court, did not justify its direction of a verdict for the defendants. It is suggested that two other grounds existed for a direction of the verdict, viz.: a failure of proof as to damages and Monsanto's rights under its patent.

Cherokee's projection of its lost profits was based upon the assumption that Cherokee remained the sole seller of Lytron and that its and Rotary's roles were reversed. Since Cherokee was excluded from the market, those were the only available figures from which the jury could infer what Cherokee's loss as a competitor would have been. Such deduction or inference was, of course, necessary.[6] If the defendants are guilty of excluding Cherokee from the market as a competitor, they cannot complain of the lack of evidence for which they are responsible. Once the fact of injury is established, the jury has considerable leeway in assessing the amount of damages. *Sunkist Growers, Inc.* v. *Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co.*, 9 Cir. 1960, 284 F.2d 1, 32, *rev'd on other grounds*, 1962, 370 U.S. 19.

Monsanto insists that there was no substantial evidence to show the *fact* as distinguished from the *amount* of damages, because Cherokee's failure in marketing the competitive product Gantrez was due solely to Pan American's disparagement of that product combined with Cherokee's

[6] We do not mean to imply that the jury must necessarily have found a lesser amount as Cherokee's damages. Eighty percent of the market was undeveloped and competition in the field would not necessarily have resulted in price reduction or in decrease of the volume of sales.

own business ineptitude. The jury could have determined that Pan American was justified in discouraging the use of Gantrez under its patent and that such action was reasonably to be anticipated. Whether Cherokee suffered losses attributable to antitrust violations or to other economic factors were matters for the jury's consideration and determination.

As to Monsanto's patent, we need go no further than the "starting point":

> "Our starting point is the general rule that the first authorized sale of a patented article 'exhausts' the patent monopoly.[64]
>
> [64] *Hobbie* v. *Jennison*, 149 U.S. 355 (1893); *Adams* v. *Burke*, 17 Wall. 453 (U.S. 1873); *United States* v. *Univis Lens Co.*, 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Cf. *Mitchell* v. *Hawley*, 16 Wall. 544 (U.S. 1873)."

Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955), at 240. Monsanto's patent did not permit it to vest Rotary with the arbitrary power to price Cherokee out of the market. Nor could Monsanto's contract with Rotary operate to combine its patent monopoly with that of Pan American and thus to vest in Rotary power to price a competitor out of the market. See *United States* v. *New Wrinkle, Inc.*, 1952, 342 U.S. 371, 378, 379.

IV.

We think also that the evidence presented a case for the jury's determination as to whether the defendants monopolized or attempted to monopolize the market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Rotary remains the sole distributor of any product having the combined ability to flocculate and beneficiate in the drilling of oil wells in the United States. Pan American has approved no product

other than Lytron for use under its patent. It was for the jury to say whether the realities of the market situation eliminate Gantrez as an effective substitute for Lytron. No other substitute exists, except perhaps some within the exclusive knowledge of Pan American and which it refuses to reveal. In this limited and narrow field it was open to the jury to find that the defendants monopolized or attempted to monopolize the market. Compare *United States* v. *E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.*, 1956, 351 U.S. 377.

V.

The district court did not err in directing a verdict for the defendants as to any violation of the Texas antitrust laws. There was no evidence that Monsanto or Rotary imposed any restriction on intrastate commerce. The dealings between Monsanto and Rotary were in interstate commerce, and Monsanto's refusal to deal with Cherokee was in interstate commerce. Any restraint on the marketing of the product was imposed in interstate commerce and not after the product had been put into intrastate commerce. The legality vel non of the dealings should be tested by the federal antitrust laws and not by those of the State of Texas. *Sloan* v. *Miami Margarine Co.*, Tex. Civ. App. 1952, 247 S.W.2d 169, 171, 172; *Denison Mattress Factory* v. *Spring-Air Co.*, 5 Cir. 1962, 308 F.2d 403, 413.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

OCTOBER TERM, 1966

No. 22736

D. C. Docket No. 4133 — Civil Action

CHEROKEE LABORATORIES, INC.,
Appellant,

versus

ROTARY DRILLING SERVICES, INC., ET AL.,
Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.

Before RIVES, WISDOM and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, and was argued by counsel;

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court;

It is further ordered and adjudged that the appellees, Rotary Drilling Services, Inc., and others, be condemned, in solido, to pay the costs of this cause in this Court for which execution may be issued out of the said District Court.

July 25, 1967

Court Costs:
Docketing cause, etc. $25.00

Issued as Mandate:

APPENDIX B

SHERMAN ACT, Sections 1, 2: (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2)

"§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; exception of resale price agreements; penalty

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal: *Provided,* That nothing contained in sections 1-7 of this title shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for such resale, and the making of such contracts or agreements shall not be an unfair method of competition under section 45 of this title: *Provided further,* That the preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices on any commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1-7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by

fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. July 2, 1890. c. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209; Aug. 17, 1937, c. 690, Title VIII, 50 Stat. 693; July 7, 1955, c. 281, 69 Stat. 282."

"§ 2. Monopolizing trade a misdemeanor; penalty

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. July 2, 1890, c. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209; July 7, 1955, c. 281, 69 Stat. 282."

PATENTS ACT, Section 154: (35 USC § 154)

"§ 154. Contents and term of patent

Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof. A copy of the specification and drawings shall be annexed to the patent and be a part thereof. July 19, 1952, c. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 804."

SUPREME COURT, U. S.

JAN 5 1968

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1967

No. 841

MONSANTO COMPANY,
ROTARY DRILLING SERVICES, INC.,
and PETE BARTLETT,

Petitioners,

v.

CHEROKEE LABORATORIES, INC.,

Respondent.

REPLY TO PETITIONS OF MONSANTO, ROTARY AND BARTLETT FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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REPLY TO PETITIONS OF MONSANTO, ROTARY AND BARTLETT FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Respondent, Cherokee Laboratories, Inc., presents this Reply to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Monsanto Company, Rotary Drilling Services, Inc., and Pete Bartlett.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioners' statement of the question presented is deceptive. Both Petitions seek to convey the impression that the opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals restricts valid patent rights, and involves basic patent law. This is incorrect.

As the Fifth Circuit notes, the patent question is wholly immaterial. The patent rights were fully exhausted prior to the imposition of the trade restraints and monopolistic control which the Court found violative of the anti-trust laws.

The question here presented should be more properly framed: Will a combination and agreement which creates a monopoly in a particular field of commerce (wholly unrelated to any patent possessed by any of the Petitioners) and which has the effect of suppressing and eliminating competition from the field, thereby excluding a competitor (the Plaintiff, Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. which actually developed the market for the product), be deemed violative of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act where the facts show such combination and monopolization to be in unreasonable restraint of trade, and where public injury is established?

STATEMENT

The Statement of Facts contained in the opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is correct. The Statements contained in the Petitions for Writ of Certiorari need to be read in light of the Statement of Facts in the Court of Appeals opinion, since they are incomplete in certain respect. In addition, such statements indicate that Rotary Drilling Services was an "agent" of Monsanto Company, and that Monsanto gave Rotary a "license" under its patent to market the product in question. This is not correct.

The facts of this case reveal a particularly brutal and oppressive use of monopoly power created through combination. Rotary, essentially a one man concern, secured an exclusive sales agreement from Monsanto covering oil field distribution of Lytron 886, the beneficial use of which in the oil well drilling industry was then relatively unknown. Cherokee, with an established and active sales force, undertook the promotion of the product. After approximately two years of development, the product became established as a result of Cherokee's effort. It was then that Rotary decided to eliminate Cherokee from the market, through the use of the monoply position acquired through the combination of the exclusive sales agreement with Monsanto and license under a patent obtained by Pan American Petroleum Corporation covering the unique combination of uses of the product in the oil well drilling field. Since no other product was licensed by Pan-Am under the "use" patent, and Rotary had the only supply of the product for use in the oil field by virtue of the contract with Monsanto, the monoply position was doubly insured. After deciding to make use of the monopoly power, Rotary at first refused to sell to Cherokee, then agreed to sell upon terms which made competition impossible. Rotary then proceeded to pirate the sales force of Cherokee. Monsanto had an opportunity to prevent the elimination of Cherokee by the market by simply selling both to Rotary and Cherokee, but refused to do so. With full knowledge of the facts, according to Monsanto's own testimony, the exclusive agreement with Rotary was renewed on January 28, 1963, although there was no obligation to renew the agreement. Prior to the renewal, Chero-

kee had advised Monsanto of the actions of Rotary, and had attempted to purchase from Monsanto, but was refused the right to do so. Monsanto was completely aware that its action would certainly result in the elimination of Cherokee from the market. In addition, the evidence shows that Monsanto closely scrutinized and "policed" all sales to insure that none of the product sold to others for non-oil field use would be resold, marketed or used in the oil field in competition with Rotary. As an inevitable result, Cherokee was eliminated from the market it had developed.

REASONS FOR REFUSING THE WRIT

1. The Patent Argument

Basically, both Petitions for Writ of Error attempt to persuade this Court that this is actually a patent case, and that the Fifth Circuit has erroneously applied anti-trust laws to restrict valid patent rights.

Nothing could be further from the truth. In actuality, the Petitioners never proved by competent evidence adduced in Court that Monsanto did in fact have a patent on the product Lytron 886. Disregarding this, however, the facts clearly show that Monsanto's patent, if it does exist, is completely immaterial. As the Fifth Circuit points out, the Court need go no further than the starting point. The starting point, i.e., the first sale, which completely exhausts the patent rights, and the following equally valid reasons completely refute the Petitioners' argument.

(a) Monsanto has not granted a license of any part of its patent rights to Rotary; therefore, the fact that Monsanto has a patent is immaterial.

Monsanto simply has entered into an exclusive selling contract with Rotary. It did not grant an assignment of any patent rights to Rotary, nor did it license Rotary under the patent. See Section 242, 69 C.J.S., Patents; and definition of assignment, Section 220, ibid.

A contract giving an exclusive right to sell a patented article which makes no mention of patents, patent licenses, royalties, or anything else, to indicate that it is a license is as a general rule governed and controlled by the general law in respect to its requisites and validity, construction and operation, performance or breach, and the remedies of the parties thereon. See 69 C.J.S. *Patents*, Section 274, page 834. Clearly, therefore, the agreement in this case, having none of the attributes or characteristices of a license, is to be judged in light of the "general law" i.e., the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.

(b) *The agreement between Rotary and Monsanto was not reasonably designed to secure the patent reward, but inured to Rotary's benefit and is beyond the scope of the patent privilege.*

The patent monopoly extends only to manufacture, use and sale of a patented article. It is designed to develop the useful arts by encouraging invention. See *U. S. v. Timken Roller Bearing Company*, 83 F. Supp. 284 (1949). Only the inventor is intended to be rewarded by the patent. Thus, the

sale of a patented article by the patentee secures the pecuniary reward to the inventor and exhausts the patent monopoly in the article. See *United States v. Univis Lens Co.*, 316 U.S. 241, 86 L. Ed. 1408 (1942) and *U. S. Ethyl Gasoline Corp.*, 27 F. Supp. 959. An agreement which inures to the benefit of the licensee or non-patent holder and restricts trade is condemned by the Sherman Act. This is illustrated by the case of *United States v. Crown Zellerbach*, 141 F. Supp. 118 (1956) in which the Court states at page 127:

> "Restraints upon competition for the benefit of the licensee are to be measured not by the standards of the patent laws, but by the general rules governing the validity of competitive restrictions attached to the conveyance of personal property * * * by serving the interest of Crown, (the licensee) and not Alsco (the licensor) the agreement presents a genuine and triable issue under the Sherman act."

In this case, the agreement between Monsanto and Rotary, even if it could be construed as a license, operated for the benefit of Rotary and not Monsanto, which by the sale of the product exhausted its patent monopoly. The agreement restricts competition, not in Monsanto's favor, but in favor of Rotary by giving the latter a monopoly in a field that did not come within the scope of the patent grant. Clearly, therefore, the combination between Monsanto and Rotary is to be judged under the Sherman Act.

(c) *The agreement between Rotary and Monsanto cannot be used to extend the patent monopoly or to restrain trade.*

A patent may not be used to extend control over or to monopolize a product, process, device, combination, com-

position, or use which is not within the scope of the patent grant. *Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continent Investment Company*, 320 U.S. 661, 88 L. Ed. 376 (1943); *U. S. v. Masonite*, 316 U.S. 65, 86 L. Ed. 1461 (1942); and *Barber-Colman Company v. National Tool Company*, 136 F. 2d 339. In this case the patent asserted by Monsanto pertains to a product, but the agreement between the Petitioners resulted in a restraint of trade and a monopoly in a particular and unique use area which is wholly foreign to Monsanto's patent and which is, in fact, defined by a separate patent. This amounts to an unlawful extension of the patent monopoly into a field not covered by the patent.

In addition, disregarding the question of monopoly extension, a patent may not be used to restrain trade except as necessarily incident to realization of the pecuniary reward by the patentee. *U. S. v. Timken Roller Bearing Company*, 83 F. Supp. 284 (1949). Assuming the applicability of the Monsanto patent, such patent, insofar as pertinent, only gave Monsanto the exclusive right to make and sell Lytron 886. After having exercised such right, Monsanto could not lawfully enter into an agreement the direct effect of which was to control subsequent trade and commerce, that is, subsequent sales in a field which obviously did not come within the scope of the patent. Monsanto has no patent rights in the use area in which a monopoly has been created and in which competition has been suppressed.

Likewise, Monsanto had no right to "police" the ultimate market, which was first serviced by Cherokee and then by Rotary after elimination of Cherokee. Monsanto

went to great lengths to insure that no sale to a customer other than Rotary (for non-oilfield use) would find ultimate distribution in the oilfield industry in competition with Rotary. The evidence is replete with instances in which this occurred.

Monsanto's lawful monopoly, if any it has, was exhausted with its sale to Rotary. Therefore, the "terminal result" of the agreement with Rotary brings it within the ambit of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. On this point, see also *United States v. Vehicular Parking*, 54 F. Supp. 828 (1944). It is obvious that the restraint present in this case results from the combination with Rotary and not from lawful exercise of any patent rights by Monsanto.

(d) *If the agreement between Rotary and Monsanto be considered a license, then the Petitioners are guilty of a prohibited form of cross-licensing.*

Rotary is a non-exclusive licensee under a Pan American use or application patent. Lytron 886 is the only product ever approved by Pan American under this patent. Therefore, by giving Rotary an exclusive on the product in the oilfield industry, a monopoly has been created in Rotary which is completely beyond the scope of either the Rotary license or the alleged Monsanto patent, i.e., a monopoly on sales and distribution of the product (not patented by Pan American) for use or application in the oil industry (not covered by the Monsanto patent.)

Cross-licensing of patents, thereby extending the patent monopoly possessed by the cross licensee in such a way as

to restrain trade or monopolize or tend to monopolization is illegal and within the prohibition of the Sherman Act. See *United States v. Line Material Company*, 333 U.S. 287, 68 S. Ct. 550, 982 L. Ed. 701 (1948); *Clapper v. Original Cab Company*, 165 F. Supp. 565; *U.S. v. Krasnov*. 143 F. Supp. 184, affm'd 355 U.S. 5.

Thus, for several reasons, it is obvious that any appeal to this Court based upon a patent argument is wholly without merit.

2. The Economic Argument

Monsanto appeals to this Court for "guidance" in its marketing policies. This approach is as unique as the combination of functions performed by the product Lytron 886 when used as a drilling mud additive.

Having formed a combination which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, and which creates a monopoly, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Monsanto, or Rotary for that matter, can hardly be heard now to appeal for absolution on the basis that they are entitled to this Court's advice on marketing policies without having imposed upon them the sanctions of the anti-trust laws.

The attempt to foister upon this court a "good intent in selecting marketing system" argument, and to convey the impression that the Fifth Circuit's opinion has "far reaching consequences" with respect to marketing of various products through exclusive distributors, is wholly specious. The fallacies in this approach are readily apparent.

In the first place, proof of a specific intent to violate the anti-trust laws is not necessary. In the second place, the fact situation in this case is so unusual and novel that the decision can have effect only upon these parties, the product involved, and this particular marketing system. This is not a case of selection of an exclusive distributor to market one of a competitive number of products in a fungible market. It is a situation where an exclusive distributorship created a monopoly and caused the elimination of the very company which created and developed the particular market involved. The contention that this was in good faith is an affront to credibility when consideration is given to the highly unfair competitive practices employed by Rotary and Pete Bartlett, and the fact that Monsanto renewed its exclusive agreement with full knowledge of the employment of these tactics by Rotary and Bartlett, and with equally complete knowledge that the renewal of the exclusive arrangement and the refusal to sell to Cherokee would cause the elimination of the one company responsible for development of the oil field market for the product.

3. Violations of the Anti-Trust Laws.

In conclusion, the Applications for Writ of Certiorari should be refused because the Court of Civil Appeals correctly held that there was evidence of violations of the anti-trust laws consisting of (1) unreasonable restraints of trade through combination to the public injury and detriment, (2) monopolization of a particular product market, also created through combination, (3) the illegal suppression and elimination of competition, and (4) a concerted re-

fusal to deal. The latter two constitute *per se* violations. The basis for the lower court's holding is well expounded in the opinion, and well documented by the authorities cited by the Court, and needs no repetition.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petitions for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Reply to Petitions for Writ of Certiorari has been served upon each respective attorney of record for the petitioners by depositing the same in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, properly addressed on the 3rd day of January, 1967.

Jack N. Price

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1967

No. 842

ROTARY DRILLING SERVICES, INC. and
F. M. BARTLETT,
Petitioners,

vs.

CHEROKEE LABORATORIES, INC.,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1967

No. .....

ROTARY DRILLING SERVICES, INC. and
F. M. BARTLETT,
Petitioners,

vs.

CHEROKEE LABORATORIES, INC.,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Rotary Drilling Services, Inc. and F. M. Bartlett, the petitioners herein, pray that a Writ of Certiorari be issued requiring the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to certify to this Court for its review the case of Cherokee Laboratories, Inc., Appellant, vs. Rotary Drilling Services, Inc., et al., Appellees, No. 22736, which is reported in ..... F. 2d ..... The opinion is appended hereto as Appendix "A".

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION

The opinion and judgment of the United States Court of Appeals was rendered July 25, 1967, petition for rehearing was denied September 13, 1967, and order for stay of mandate for filing petition for certiorari was entered September 26, 1967, for a period of 60 days.

The statutory provision believed to confer jurisdiction upon this Court to review the judgment in question is 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The question presented for review is:

Do Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 and 2, require the manufacturer of a patented product, its exclusive distributor, or both, to sell the product to a customer who desires to resell it in competition with the distributor, when other and equivalent brands of the same product are not readily available in the market?

STATUTES

The case involves Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 and 2:

"1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal: * * *."

"2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-

eign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Federal jurisdiction in the court of first instance (the United States Court for the Eastern District of Texas) was based upon 15 U.S.C. 22.

As was observed by the Court of Appeals, there is no real dispute as to the substantive facts. The case turns on the inferences to be drawn from those facts.

Respondent Cherokee Laboratories, Inc., plaintiff in the trial court and herein referred to as "Cherokee", was engaged in the business of selling additives to drilling mud used in the drilling of oil wells. It sold several products for this purpose.

Petitioner Rotary Drilling Services, Inc., herein referred to as "Rotary", a corporation wholly owned by Petitioner F. M. Bartlett, herein referred to as "Bartlett", was engaged in substantially the same business as Cherokee but sold its products through jobbers or manufacturers' representatives and did not maintain a sales force. (R. 123)

This case involves a patented product known as Lytron 886, hereinafter referred to as "Lytron", which is manufactured by Monsanto Company, also a defendant in the trial court, and which is herein referred to as "Monsanto". (R. 111)

On September 15, 1953, U. S. Patent No. 2,652,380 was granted to Monsanto covering the composition and

manufacture of Lytron. Monsanto attempted to market the product as a soil conditioner under the name "Krillium" but was unsuccessful. (R. 114) It also discovered that Lytron had potential as a drilling mud additive and made some sales for this purpose.

In 1956, Rotary began selling Lytron as a flocculating agent in oil well drilling, the purpose of its use being to flocculate or congeal the drilled solids and settle them out of the mud system. (R. 111-116) In about 1957, Pan American Petroleum Corporation, not a party to this action, at its research laboratories, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, began experimental work with Lytron and discovered that in addition to acting as a flocculating agent, this product would "beneficiate" or extend the yield of Bentonite, a clay commonly mixed with water to form the mud used in the drilling of oil wells by the use of rotary tools. (R. 121) That is, with the use of Lytron, less Bentonite would produce the required mud. (R. 766) On March 25, 1960, Pan American applied for a patent covering this unique combination of uses as to this and similar products, and on December 25, 1962, was granted Patent No. 3,070,543 relating to products having the combined ability to flocculate and beneficiate drilling muds in the oil drilling industry. (R. 121)

At about the same time as it filed its patent application, Pan American granted a non-exclusive license to Rotary to market the product. Rotary purchased the product from Monsanto in large quantities at 80 or 85 cents per pound depending upon whether it purchased in carload lots and placed the material in two pound bags which were in turn sold to Cherokee under the trade name "Ben-Ex" at $1.25 per pound. (R. 121-122, 759)

In February, 1961, Monsanto and Rotary entered into a written agreement by which Monsanto agreed to sell

Rotary its requirements of Lytron for a term of two years, and refer all inquiries from the oil industry to Rotary. The agreement, and the renewal thereof dated February 1, 1963, are set forth in full in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Exhibit "A". (R. 117-118)

Cherokee makes no claim that there was any contractual agreement of any kind between Rotary and Cherokee which gave Cherokee any tenure as distributor of Lytron. (R. 82)

Cherokee sold the product to drilling mud companies at $2.00 per pound, most of it going to four companies which are dominant in the industry. (R. 765) They in turn sold it to the ultimate users (oil producers or drilling contractors) along with Bentonite and other products sold by them. This arrangement remained in effect until January, 1963. (R. 112, 764-765)

In January of 1963, Kenneth D. Fisher left the employ of Cherokee and became an employee of Rotary. At about the same time, four of Cherokee's salesmen left the employ of Cherokee and joined Rotary. (R. 112) Rotary advised Cherokee that it would henceforth sell the product direct to the drilling mud companies and advised Cherokee that if it desired to continue to purchase the product, its price would be $1.80 per pound. Rotary reduced the price to customers on sales of 10,000 to 20,000 pounds to $1.90 per pound and for 20,000 pounds or more to $1.80 per pound. (R. 112-113)

Cherokee was dissatisfied with the new price. (R. 1895) It attempted to purchase the product direct from Monsanto, but was unable to do so. (R. 802-815)

The last purchase of Lytron by Cherokee was at $1.80 per pound on April 29, 1963. Shortly thereafter, Cherokee ceased selling Lytron. (R. 1892-1896)

Cherokee had previously conducted tests on another product known as Gantrez which is manufactured by General Aniline and Film Corporation. Its testing had demonstrated to it that the product was equal to Lytron, and it then commenced marketing Gantrez for the same purpose as Lytron under the name "New and Improved Ben-Ex". (R. 1683-1684) Cherokee made 10 or 12 sales of Gantrez. Its executive in charge of sales testified that the product was "catching on" when the market suddenly "dried up" after Pan American Petroleum Corporation sent a letter to its field offices stating that Gantrez was inferior to Lytron. (R. 1685-1686)

Cherokee's complaint seeks treble damages measured by the profits it would have made had it continued as the sole distributor of Lytron to the oil industry, alleging that the actions of Rotary, Monsanto and Bartlett are in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals has held that despite the fact that Monsanto is the holder of a patent covering the composition and manufacture of the product Lytron 886, it does not have the right to make Rotary its exclusive selling agent, and that Rotary, being the exclusive distributor, does not have the right to refuse to sell the product to Cherokee unless there are other and equivalent brands of the same product readily available in the market.

This holding is in direct conflict with the patent laws of the United States and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.

The case of *Virtue* v. *Creamery Package Mfg. Co.*, 227 U.S. 8 (1912) long ago established the proposition that a

manufacturer, holding a patent on its product, may constitute another its exclusive sales agent *and that such exclusive agreement does not violate the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 and 2)*.

In so holding, recognizing that the patent laws authorize the creation of legal monopolies, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McKenna, said,

> "The Owatonna Company was a manufacturer of churns and butter workers under various patents owned by it, which articles it sold throughout the United States, and by the contract of April 19, 1897, it constituted the Creamery Package Manufacturing Company its sales agent of them, * * *. The contract was a perfectly legal one * * *. There were contracts between the Creamery Package Manufacturing Company and the Owatonna Company subsequent to the latter date, but all of them were supplemental to the first one and had no illegal taint. *It is true that they granted rights to the Creamery Package Company, and exclusive rights, but this was no violation of law. The owner of a patent has exclusive rights—rights of making, using and selling. He may keep them or transfer them to another—keep some of them and transfer others.*" (Emphasis supplied)

The rule remains unchanged and, until the present case, has been uniformly followed in the various circuits. See *Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisele & Co.*, 86 F. 2d 267 (6th Cir. 1936), *Extracol Process, Ltd. v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc.*, 153 F. 2d 264 (7th Cir. 1946), *Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co.*, 211 F. 2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954).

As was stated by the Court of Appeals in *Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisele & Co., supra,* at page 268,

> "The Patentee is the sole judge of the licensee he shall select to make, to sell, or to use his patented article. Patentee's reasons for selection of its licensee

are of no concern to others. * * *. *This is settled law.*" (Emphasis supplied)

Having been selected by Monsanto to sell the patented article, does Rotary thereby "monopolize" under the Sherman Act?

Can it be that Monsanto may lawfully transfer a part of its patent monopoly to Rotary, yet Rotary may not lawfully receive it because of the anti-monopoly provisions of the Sherman Act?

The answer must of necessity be in the negative, because it is a part of the lawful monopoly of the patent which is conveyed.

Such was the precise holding of this court in *Virtue* v. *Creamery Package Mfg. Co., supra.* "It is true that they granted rights to (Rotary) and exclusive rights, but this was no violation of law."

Monsanto has a lawful patent monopoly, all or any part of which it could lawfully transfer to Rotary.

As was said in *Schwing Motor Co.* v. *Hudson Sales Co.* at 138 F. Supp. 899, opinion affirmed and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit at 239 F. 2d 176, cert. den. 355 U.S. 823,

> "An exclusive agency or dealership necessarily involves a limited monopoly to sell the product of the manufacturer in the area covered by the exclusive agreement. Such limited monopolies are not invalid, Windsor Theatre Co. v. Wallbrook Amusement Co., supra; Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 3 Cir., 155 F. 2d 99, unless they are used to violate the antitrust laws. They may not be used to extend the producers' monopoly into other fields, e.g. the financing of General Motors automobiles, United States v. General Motors Corporation, 7 Cir., 121 F. 2d 376; Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558,

71 S. Ct. 408, 95 L. Ed. 534, modifying 7 Cir., 181 F. 2d 70. Nor may they be used to establish market dominance and drive out the products of competitors. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S. Ct. 1107, 92 L. Ed. 1533. *But the mere fact that such an agreement necessarily gives the dealer a monopoly* in handling the product of the particular manufacturer in a given area, and thereby enables the dealer to dictate the price at which the products of that manufacturer shall be sold in that area, subject to competition with the products of other manufacturers, *does not condemn such agreements; otherwise all exclusive agency agreements would be illegal per se.* Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S. Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311; Windsor Theatre Co. v. Wallbrook Amusement Co., 4 Cir., 189 F. 2d 797; Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., D. C. Md., 26 F. Supp. 824." (Emphasis supplied)

The possession of a lawful monopoly, which of necessity gives Rotary the power to determine the method by which the product will be marketed and the price at which it will sell it, must also give it the right to refuse to deal under the standards established by *U. S.* v. *Colgate and Co.*, 250 U.S. 300, and the decisions under it.

As was said by the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit in *Ace Beer Distributors, Inc.* v. *Kohn, Inc.*, 318 F. 2d 283 (1963),

> "In essence, the complaint alleges that the defendants conspired to destroy plaintiff's business and to eliminate it as a beer distributor in interstate commerce and that this was accomplished by the termination by Stroh of plaintiff's franchise as its beer distributor and thereafter conducting its business through another distributor. * * *."
>
> "That, without the results proscribed by the Sherman Act, is not a violation of the Act. A manufacturer has a right to select its customers and to refuse to

> sell its goods to anyone, for reasons sufficient unto itself. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S. Ct. 465, 63 L. Ed. 992. A refusal to deal becomes illegal under the act only when it produces an unreasonable restraint of trade, such as price fixing, elimination of competition or the creation of a monopoly. (Citations omitted) The fact that a refusal to deal with a particular buyer without more, may have an adverse effect upon the buyer's business does not make the refusal to deal a violation of the Sherman Act. Damage alone does not constitute liability under the act."

None of these abuses is claimed to have been committed by Rotary.

The fallacy, we think, in the rule as applied by the Court of Appeals is in its assumption that a monopoly is created by Rotary's refusal to deal with Cherokee, when in fact the monopoly is created, not by Rotary, or anything it has done, but by the patent.

The same is true of its holding that there is an issue of fact as to whether there may have been a conspiracy between Rotary and Fisher to induce some of Cherokee's salesmen to join Rotary in furtherance of the creation of a monopoly in Rotary.

The employment of those men, unless for the purposes of creating a monopoly or other restraint of trade forbidden by the Sherman Act, is not unlawful. *Harley & Lund Corp.* v. *Murray Rubber Co.*, 31 F. 2d 932.

Again, the monopoly complained of was created by the patent, and whether or not Rotary induced Cherokee's employees to leave Cherokee and join Rotary, or conspired with others to do so, cannot have added to nor detracted in any measure from the complete monopoly it already lawfully possessed.

Rotary is not accused of abusing the patent monopoly—only of exercising it by deciding to stop marketing Lytron through Cherokee as an exclusive jobber and to perform that function itself.

It did not attempt to extend the patent monopoly to other products, or into other areas of commerce. It did not make tieing agreements, attempt to control resale prices, or indulge in any of the numerous activities which have been condemned as abuses under the antitrust laws. It did only what the lawful and natural monopoly of the product gave it the power to do—select its customers.

The issue of whether there are competitive products is, we submit, wholly unrelated to the patent question. Ordinarily it would be expected that the existence of the patent would preclude the possibility of the availability of other brands of the same product.

It is the uniqueness of the product which makes it patentable, and it is totally anomalous to hold that the existence or absence of competitive products determines the validity of the patent monopoly when related to the Sherman Act.

The error of the Court of Appeals becomes readily apparent when we draft a syllabus to reflect the rule of law thereby established:

> Neither the holder of a patent, nor its licensee, has the exclusive right to sell the patented product unless there are other and equivalent brands of the same product readily available in the market.

WHEREFORE, these petitioners respectfully submit that a writ of certiorari should issue, that this Court may review the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit, and that upon the review thereof that Court be directed to affirm the decision of the trial court.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX "A"

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22736

CHEROKEE LABORATORIES, INC.,
Appellant,

versus

ROTARY DRILLING SERVICES, INC., ET AL.,
Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

(July 25, 1967.)

Before RIVES, WISDOM and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.

RIVES, Circuit Judge: The plaintiff[1] seeks damages arising out of alleged violations by defendants[2] of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 and

1. Cherokee Laboratories, Inc., hereafter referred to as "Cherokee."

2. Monsanto Company, Rotary Drilling Services, Inc., Kenneth D. Fisher and F. M. Bartlett, hereafter referred to as "Monsanto," "Rotary," "Fisher," and "Bartlett," respectively.

2, and the Texas antitrust laws, Arts. 7426-7447, Texas Revised Civil Statutes. The district court quashed the service of summons on the defendant Bartlett. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the district court directed a verdict for the remaining defendants. From the ensuing judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

The complaint relates to a highly specialized commodity in a very limited market. Cherokee's principal business is that of marketing additives to mud systems in drilling oil and gas wells. The product Lytron 886, hereafter Lytron, is a chemical polymeric compound originally developed by Monsanto research chemists for its effects on the fertility and cultivation of the soil. On September 15, 1953, U.S. Patent No. 2,652,380, was granted to Monsanto covering the composition and manufacture of Lytron. Its attempts to market the product for soil treatment met with failure, but it soon discovered that Lytron had potential as a drilling mud additive.

Rotary is an Oklahoma corporation, whose sole stockholder, prior to January 1963 was Bartlett. In 1956, Rotary began selling Lytron as a flocculating agent, that is an agent which "flocs" or congeals drilled solids and bit cuttings and settles them out of the mud system. About 1957 Pan American Petroleum Corporation, with research laboratories in Tulsa, Oklahoma, began experimental work with Lytron through which it later discovered that Lytron, in addition to acting as a flocculating agent, would "beneficiate," that is extend the yield of bentonite, a clay used as a mud builder in drilling mud systems. On March 25, 1960, Pan American applied for a patent covering this unique combination of uses of this and similar products, and on December 25, 1962 was granted Patent Number 3,070,543. This suit relates to the market of products having the combined ability to flocculate and beneficiate drill-

ing muds in the oil field drilling industry in the United States. We accept Cherokee's description of the relevant market:

> "The Pan American patent actually defines the scope of the product market (i.e., products have combined beneficiating and selective flocculating abilities when used in a drilling mud system).
>
> "Geographically, the market for the product is the United States. The size of the market is not measured by area, but by the number of wells in which low solids drilling fluids can be used (R. 1259). The market for Ben-Ex (Cherokee's tradename) is a fairly small percentage of the total wells drilled in the United States each year, but there are approximately 55,000 to 60,000 wells drilled in a year, and an appreciable number of these are wells in which this material could be used (R. 1327). According to Dr. Paul Hawley, of Pan American Petroleum Corporation, there are at least 5,000 wells per year drilled in which Ben-Ex could be used, and Pan American Petroleum Corporation drills about 500 of these (R. 1259). At the end of 1963, only approximately 1,000 of these wells, or 20 percent of the potential market, was being serviced (R. 1327).
>
> "The market for Lytron 886 increased from 100 wells drilled in 1961, to a thousand wells per year by the end of 1963 (R. 1327). The principal customers for the product are Magnet Cove Barium Corporation, Houston, Texas; Baroid Division, National Lead Company, Houston, Texas; International Minerals and Chemicals Corporation, Houston, Texas; Milwhite Mud Sales Company, Houston, Texas, and numerous small mud companies (R. 1190)."

At about the same time as it filed its application for the patent, Pan American granted a nonexclusive license

to Rotary to market the product. From early 1960 until January of 1963, Rotary did not have a sales organization; it made no sales of Lytron directly to drillers or mud service companies, but sold only to Cherokee for resale to the oil and gas industry. Cherokee, being the only concern selling the product during this period, developed the market and it became one of the most important products sold by Cherokee.

In February, 1961, Monsanto and Rotary entered into the following written agreement:

"Rotary Drilling Services, Inc.
Post Office Box 7265
Tulsa, Oklahoma

Attention: Mr. F. M. Bartlett

Gentlemen:

Summarizing our previous correspondence and the discussions which you have had with Mr. Wilkinson, Monsanto proposes to reply (sic) on you to promote the use of our polyelectrolyte resin Lytron 886 as an additive to oil well drilling muds on the following basis:

1. Monsanto will sell you your full requirements of Lytron 886 for a period of two years beginning March 1, 1961. The price and terms of sale of this product will be those currently in effect and as they may be changed from time to time. Current prices and terms of sale are set forth in the attached price schedule. Please note that, as set forth in the Conditions of Sale appearing on the reverse of the present price schedule, Monsanto cannot be liable for any claims arising from use of our products in a buyer's manufacturing processes or in combination with other substances.

2. Monsanto will refer to you all inquiries which it may receive during this two-year period

relative to use of Lytron 886 in oil well drilling mud applications. You are aware, however, that we have other customers for this material and that legally we would have no right to attempt to restrict the end use made by others as to products sold them.

3. You agree to make all reasonable efforts to promote the use of Lytron 886 in oil well drilling muds through sales activities, advertising and other marketing efforts to be conducted by you and at your own expense. Monsanto will, however, stand ready to provide you such technical assistance as in our judgment would be helpful to support this promotional effort.

4. Prior to the expiration of the two-year period of this agreement, the parties will review the progress which has been made and the prospects, as they then appear, for future growth in your proposed use of Lytron 886 and will discuss an appropriate basis for a continued relationship.

"If the foregoing is agreeable with you and you wish to go forward in accordance with it, please so indicate by signing and returning to us the attached copy of this letter.

Very truly yours,

s/c C. L. Jones
C. L. Jones
Director of Sales
Resin and Coating Products

mpd
Enclosures (2)

Date: .....

Agreed to:

ROTARY DRILLING SERVICES, INC.

By s/ Floyd M. Bartlett
F. M. BARTLETT

Its President"

From 1955 until January 1963, Fisher was with Cherokee, first as sales engineer, then sales manager, then vice president and finally as president. In January 1963, Fisher and four of Cherokee's salesmen left Cherokee and joined Rotary which began selling directly to the mud companies.

Rotary was purchasing Lytron from Monsanto at 0.80 or 0.85 per pound, depending on whether it was purchased in carload or partial lots. Up to January 1963, Rotary was selling Lytron to Cherokee at $1.25 per pound and Cherokee was reselling it to mud companies at $2.00 per pound and to drilling companies at $2.85 per pound. Monsanto did not raise its price to Rotary. However, after Rotary took over sole distribution of Lytron, it raised the price to Cherokee from $1.25 to $1.80 per pound. Rotary also absorbed freight to the nearest warehousing point to the customer, and reduced its price to customers on sales from 10,000 to 20,000 pounds from $2.00 to $1.90 per pound, and at 20,000 pounds or over to $1.80 per pound.

On February 1, 1963, the sales agreement between Monsanto and Rotary heretofore quoted, *supra* pp. A4-A5, was renewed by letter agreement as follows:

"Rotary Drilling Services, Inc.
Post Office Box 7265
Tulsa, Oklahoma

Attention: Mr. F. M. Bartlett

Gentlemen:

Monsanto Chemical Company is agreeable to the renewal of our agreement dated February 13, 1961, for a period of two years beginning March 1, 1963. A copy of the terms of this agreement is attached.

If the foregoing is agreeable with you, and you wish to go forward in accordance with it, please so indicate by signing and returning to us the attached copy of this letter.

Very truly yours,

s/ T. B. Wilkinson
T. B. Wilkinson
Product Sales Manager
Industrial Resins

TBW: lhs

Date: Feb. 1, 1963

Rotary Drilling Services, Inc.

By s/ F. M. Bartlett
F. M. Bartlett
Its President"

Cherokee attempted to purchase Lytron from Monsanto but was informed "that they had some sort of arrangement with Rotary Drilling Services whereby all of the oil field sales had to go through Rotary." The last purchase of Lytron by Cherokee was from Rotary of 2000 pounds at the increased price of $1.80 per pound on April 29, 1963. Cherokee then ceased to sell Lytron, leaving Rotary as the only seller of that product to the oil and gas industry in the United States.

There was only one other product known to anyone other than Pan American which might possibly perform the same functions as Lytron, i.e., beneficiate or extend the yield of bentonite clay and flocculate or drop out drill solids. This product was manufactured by the General Aniline and Film Corporation. For the required function, it was mixed with soda ash. When so mixed the product was called "Gantrez." The research and development de-

partment of Cherokee discovered this use of Gantrez in late 1961 or early 1962. A use patent was denied because such use was already covered by the Pan American patent. In the spring of 1962, Cherokee attempted to get the product licensed by Pan American, but without success. Pan American's tests proved to its satisfaction that Gantrez was not a satisfactory product for this use. Lytron is the only product ever approved by Pan American under its patent. As to Pan American's laboratory tests of Gantrez, Dr. Paul Hawley testified:

> "Several such tests have been made. One was made when the material was originally submitted to us early in 1962, probably in the month of February. The other tests were made in late 1963 and early in 1964. In all of the tests, approximately the same results were obtained on the properties which we looked for in a material which is supposed to be a good bentonite beneficiater and a drilling solids flocculent. The material tested was not outstanding. It was better than some other materials we had tested and not as good as several others, including Lytron 886."

Commencing in October or November 1963, Cherokee attempted to market Gantrez which it represented as its new and improved Ben-Ex. Effective April 8, 1964, Cherokee secured a license agreement from Pan American subject to several provisos, including the following:

> "Licensee agrees that in its sales and promotion efforts it will not represent that Pan American endorses in any way the use of a mixture of Gantrez resin and soda ash, or its equivalent, as a drilling mud additive."

Cherokee made ten or twelve sales of Gantrez amounting to approximately 4000 pounds. The market then suddenly "dried up" after Pan American sent a letter to

its field offices stating that Cherokee's product was inferior to Lytron.

I.

The district court erred in quashing the summons served upon the defendant Bartlett. That service was under Article 2031b, Texas Civil Statutes, which provides for service on a nonresident who "engages in business" in Texas by serving the Secretary of State, as agent, in any suit "arising out of such business done in the State." Section 4 of the Article provides:

> "Any * * * nonresident natural person shall be deemed doing business in this State by entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State, or the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this State."

The complaint contained a number of allegations which would charge Bartlett with doing business in Texas. Among others, it charged that he committed a tort which included a conspiracy with Fisher then a resident of Texas, to be performed in part in Texas, the purpose and eventual result of which was to induce Cherokee's sales force to leave Cherokee and join Rotary. Service of process on Bartlett was valid.

II.

We review the district court's direction of a verdict for the defendants in the light of the Supreme Court's statement that "the right to trial by jury applies to treble damage suits under the antitrust laws, and is, in fact, an essential part of the congressional plan for making competition rather than monopoly the rule of trade, see *Fleit-*

mann v. *Welsbach Street Lighting Co.*, 240 U.S. 27, 29." *Beacon Theatres* v. *Westover*, 1959, 359 U.S. 500, 504.

So far as the testimony has developed, there is no real dispute about the substantive facts. The case turns on the inferences to be drawn from those facts. In a recent opinion by Chief Judge Tuttle,[3] this Circuit has held that *Lavender* v. *Kurn*, 1946, 327 U.S. 645, has general application in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a question for the jury:

> "If proven facts do give support to the inference necessary to sustain a plaintiff's case, then, under the rule of *Lavender*, it is immaterial that they give equal support to a contrary inference. It is only when there is a *complete absence* of probative facts to support the conclusion reached that the jury's judgment may be ignored."

The district court stated its reasons for directing a verdict as follows:

> " * * * I have been unable to find any case by any Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court that has in anywise held contrary to or overruled the holding of the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in *Kinnear-Weed versus Humble Oil and Refining Company* [214 F.2d 891, 894] to the effect that public injury is a necessary condition precedent to a cause of action such as that asserted by the Plaintiff in this case under the Federal antitrust laws.
>
> "Now, in each case that the Plaintiff has cited to the Court there has been a holding that that particular alleged violation, or violations there, was a violation per se. The evidence in this case

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3. Planters Manufacturing Company v. Protection Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Cir., No. 23019, decided May 26, 1967, ms.

wholly fails to establish, in my opinion, a per se violation of the antitrust laws.

"And, while I think there are some merits maybe to some of the other grounds asserted by the moving Defendants in their Motion for Instructed Verdict, insofar as the Federal antitrust laws are concerned, I need not go any further than this determination that the Plaintiff has wholly failed to establish in this case any public injury.

"Furthermore, I find and conclude that the Plaintiff has wholly failed to establish a case under the Texas antitrust laws.

"Therefore, the Motion for Instructed Verdict of each of the Defendants will be granted."

III.

In *Rogers* v. *Douglas Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc.*, 5 Cir. 1959, 266 F.2d 636, 644, we again gave consideration to the question of showing public injury in private Sherman Act cases and said:

"In the Sherman Act Congress has determined that certain prohibited activities are injurious to the public. * * * As to classes of restraints which from their 'nature or character' are unduly restrictive, Congress has determined its own criteria of public harm. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 79 S.Ct. 705, 709. In restraints, like the present one to which 'the rule of reason' applies, while the jury should not, and cannot properly, reject the policy of the Sherman Act which has been determined by Congress, it must still decide whether the particular conduct is reasonably calculated to prejudice the public interest which that Act is designed to protect. * * * That does not mean that specific public injury

> must be proved before a private person can recover; but before it can be said that the conduct is forbidden as *unreasonably* restraining trade or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act it must appear that it *tends* or is *reasonably calculated* to prejudice the public interest."

We adhere to those views. They are sustained in a full discussion in a recent text, Timberlake, Federal Treble Damage Antitrust Actions, ch. 15, §§ 15.01-15.07, pp. 191-206.

> "When the factual situation does not present a per se violation, before a violation may be found, it must be determined that the activity unreasonably restrains trade. If it is not unreasonable it is not a violation. The only way in which to determine whether an activity is unreasonable is to apply the test of injury to the public as part of the broader test of the rule of reason."[4]

If the evidence presented no more than the substitution of Rotary for Cherokee as the exclusive distributor of Lytron, there would be no public injury because there would be no more restraint of trade than existed at the time of the substitution. That is, however, too narrow a view. Cherokee complains that it was prevented from marketing Lytron in competition with Rotary. It was open to the jury so to find, and further to find that such a restraint is reasonably calculated to prejudice the public interest. Rotary bought Lytron from Monsanto at 80 cents per pound and resold it to the mud companies at $2.00 per pound. A jury could reasonably infer that if

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4. Timberlake's full discussion demonstrates, we think, that this view is consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with allegations and proof of "public injury" in private actions under the antitrust laws.

Rotary had competition the markup in price would be somewhat less than 150 percent. Further, Rotary was servicing only about 1000 wells per year out of a potential of at least 5000 wells per year. With two distributors competing, some of the remaining 80 percent of the potential market might have been serviced with resultant savings in drilling costs.

It was clearly open to the jury to infer from the original letter agreement, dated February 13, 1961, between Rotary and Monsanto and the correspondence leading up to that agreement that Rotary was to be the exclusive distributor of Lytron to the oil industry and that Rotary agreed to limit its sales to that industry. We agree that Cherokee proved no injury from that limitation, for Cherokee was interested only in sales to the oil industry. We agree also that, even though Rotary was to be the exclusive distributor, the initial distributorship agreement between Monsanto and Rotary may have been entirely reasonable and legal. Monsanto's attempts to market Lytron had been unsuccessful. At that time no one other than Rotary and its sole stockholder, Bartlett, expressed an interest in undertaking to develop and distribute Lytron in the oil and gas market. The market was in its infancy. Monsanto sought to establish a market for Lytron by placing it in the hands of a single distributor who would actively promote and stimulate sales for the product. We need not review the many authorities cited by the parties on the validity of exclusive dealership agreements, for the law has been fairly summarized by the Supreme Court in the very recent case of *United States* v. *Arnold, Schwinn & Co., et al.*, No. 25, Oct. Term 1966, decided June 12, 1967:

> "At the other extreme, a manufacturer of a product, *other and equivalent brands of which are*

> *readily available in the market,* may select his customers, and for this purpose he may 'franchise' certain dealers to whom, alone, he will sell his goods. Cf. *United States* v. *Colgate & Co.*, 250 U.S. 300 (1919). If the restraint stops at that point—if nothing more is involved than vertical 'confinement' of the manufacturer's own sales of the merchandise to selected dealers, *and if competitive products are readily available to others,* the restriction, on these facts alone, would not violate the Sherman Act." (Emphasis added.) (Slip opinion p. 10.)

In the present case it was open to the jury to infer that competitive products were *not* "readily available" to others. Even so, we need not decide whether a jury could properly determine that the initial distributorship agreement constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade. The critical time in this case is when their sales agreement was renewed in February 1963.

The situation had radically changed in the two years since the original agreement. While the market was not completely developed, it was no longer in its infancy. Roughly 1000 of the potential 5000 annual drillings of wells were being serviced as compared with service to only 100 wells drilled in 1961. Monsanto's sales of Lytron to Rotary had been multiplied many times:

"Year	Pounds	Price
* * * *		
1960	11,000	9,350.00
1961	36,500	31,025.00
1962	112,340	93,337.00
1963	172,750	138,200.00"

Of more immediate concern, the jury could have found that Rotary had excluded Cherokee from the mar-

ket and that Monsanto had some knowledge or notice of the dealings between Rotary and Cherokee.

Indeed, in the state of the record when the verdict was directed at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, we think that the jury could have inferred the existence of facts constituting a per se violation of Section 1 on the part of Rotary and Monsanto. The jury could have found that Monsanto refused to deal with Cherokee because of its agreement with Rotary, and that Rotary priced Cherokee out of the market which it was able to do only because of the protection of its agreement with Monsanto. Such conduct would constitute a per se violation of Section 1.[5] See *White Motor Co.* v. *United States*, 1963, 372 U.S. 253; *Klor's, Inc.* v. *Broadway-Hale Stores*, Inc., 1959, 359 U.S. 207; *Northern Pacific Railway Co.* v. *United States*, 1958, 356 U.S. 1; *Lorain Journal* v. *United States*, 1951, 342 U.S. 143, 154, 155; *Washington State Bowling Prop. Assn.* v. *Pacific Lanes, Inc.*, 9 Cir. 1966, 356 F.2d 371.

We have thought it necessary to discuss at any length only the agreements between the two corporations, Cherokee and Rotary, for the evidence clearly developed a case for the jury's determination as to whether Fisher agreed with Rotary and its sole stockholder Bartlett that Fisher and four salesmen would leave Cherokee and join Rotary to promote Rotary's sale of Lytron and to exclude Cherokee from the market.

We hold that lack of proof of public injury, the reason relied on by the district court, did not justify its direction of a verdict for the defendants. It is suggested

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5. Unless Gantrez was truly a competitive product with Lytron, which, as hereinafter discussed, also presents a question of fact for the jury.

that two other grounds existed for a direction of the verdict, viz.: a failure of proof as to damages and Monsanto's rights under its patent.

Cherokee's projection of its lost profits was based upon the assumption that Cherokee remained the sole seller of Lytron and that its and Rotary's roles were reversed. Since Cherokee was excluded from the market, those were the only available figures from which the jury could infer what Cherokee's loss as a competitor would have been. Such deduction or inference was, of course, necessary.[6] If the defendants are guilty of excluding Cherokee from the market as a competitor, they cannot complain of the lack of evidence for which they are responsible. Once the fact of injury is established, the jury has considerable leeway in assessing the amount of damages. *Sunkist Growers, Inc.* v. *Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co.*, 9 Cir. 1960, 284 F.2d 1, 32, *rev'd on other grounds*, 1962, 370 U.S. 19.

Monsanto insists that there was no substantial evidence to show the *fact* as distinguished from the *amount* of damages, because Cherokee's failure in marketing the competitive product Gantrez was due solely to Pan American's disparagement of that product combined with Cherokee's own business ineptitude. The jury could have determined that Pan American was justified in discouraging the use of Gantrez under its patent and that such action was reasonably to be anticipated. Whether Cherokee suffered losses attributable to antitrust violations or to other economic factors were matters for the jury's consideration and determination.

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6. We do not mean to imply that the jury must necessarily have found a lesser amount as Cherokee's damages. Eighty percent of the market was undeveloped and competition in the field would not necessarily have resulted in price reduction or in decrease of the volume of sales.

As to Monsanto's patent, we need go no further than the "starting point":

> "Our starting point is the general rule that the first authorized sale of a patented article 'exhausts' the patent monopoly.[64]

Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955), at 240. Monsanto's patent did not permit it to vest Rotary with the arbitrary power to price Cherokee out of the market. Nor could Monsanto's contract with Rotary operate to combine its patent monopoly with that of Pan American and thus to vest in Rotary power to price a competitor out of the market. See *United States* v. *New Wrinkle, Inc.*, 1952, 342 U.S. 371, 378, 379.

IV.

We think also that the evidence presented a case for the jury's determination as to whether the defendants monopolized or attempted to monopolize the market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Rotary remains the sole distributor of any product having the combined ability to flocculate and beneficiate in the drilling of oil wells in the United States. Pan American has approved no product other than Lytron for use under its patent. It was for the jury to say whether the realities of the market situation eliminate Gantrez as an effective substitute for Lytron. No other substitute exists, except

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[64] *Hobbie* v. *Jennison*, 149 U.S. 355 (1893); *Adams* v. *Burke*, 17 Wall. 453 (U.S. 1873); *United States* v. *Univis Lens Co.*, 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Cf. *Mitchell* v. *Hawley*, 16 Wall. 544 (U.S. 1873)."

perhaps some within the exclusive knowledge of Pan American and which it refuses to reveal. In this limited and narrow field it was open to the jury to find that the defendants monopolized or attempted to monopolize the market. Compare *United States* v. *E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.*, 1956, 351 U.S. 377.

V.

The district court did not err in directing a verdict for the defendants as to any violation of the Texas antitrust laws. There was no evidence that Monsanto or Rotary imposed any restriction on intrastate commerce. The dealings between Monsanto and Rotary were in interstate commerce, and Monsanto's refusal to deal with Cherokee was in interstate commerce. Any restraint on the marketing of the product was imposed in interstate commerce and not after the product had been put into intrastate commerce. The legality vel non of the dealings should be tested by the federal antitrust laws and not by those of the State of Texas. *Sloan* v. *Miami Margarine Co.*, Tex.Civ.App. 1952, 247 S.W.2d 169, 171, 172; *Denison Mattress Factory* v. *Spring-Air Co.*, 5 Cir. 1962, 308 F.2d 403, 413.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.